Abstract
agonising at the unwarranted delay' would resonate with many New Labour parliamentarians (Weller 2012: 154) .
Weller concludes that whilst Australian prime ministers (from both Labor and Liberal parties) are 'dogs on a very short leash', aspiring Labour prime ministers have 'no opportunity to wield the knife' (Weller 2012: 154, 157) . Does this claim explain the differences between Rudd/Gillard and Brown? Weller, himself, does not address Brown's survival against this distinction, preferring to focus in on the survival of Blair and the impotence of Brown in the face of the procedural hurdles. This article assesses whether structural factors alone explain all, or whether wider circumstances relating to the agency of incumbents, leadership aspirants, and timing in the electoral cycle and governing duration also need consideration.
Following reforms, initiated by Rudd, to the selection mechanism for the Australian Labour Party leader and now bedding down, we present a cautionary tale to the ALP in that structural changes alone do not immediately lead to a change in party culture.
Electing and Ejecting the Party Leader
The focus of the literature on leadership successions is dominated by three countries with similar polities -Britain, Australia and Canada, whose 'governing principles derived from similar constitutional assumptions' (Weller 2012: 152) . (Most of that literature tends to have a one country focus, but exceptions include Weller 1994; Davis 1998; Bynander and 't Hart 2007, 2008; Kenig 2009; 't Hart and Uhr 2011; and Cross and Blais 2012) .
However, within the single country based literature considerably more has been offered on assessing leadership successions within British political parties. Scholars have developed their work around the following themes. First, there is work that appraises individual contests to examine the quality of candidates and the significance of the campaigning period (e.g. Alderman and Carter 1991 , 1993 , 1995 Alderman 1996 Alderman , 1998 Denham and O'Hara 2008; Dorey and Denham 2006, 2011; Heppell 2008 Heppell , 2010 . Second, there is work that seeks to examine the variables that may have influenced voting behaviour at the level of the parliamentary party (e.g. Cowley and Garry 1998; Cowley and Bailey 2000; Heppell and Hill 2008 . Third, there has been a focus on the significance of amending the party leadership selection rules, or the continuing merits or otherwise of existing procedures (e.g. Stark 1996; Quinn 2004 Quinn , 2005 Quinn , 2012 . Fourth, there has been work that analyses the ease, or otherwise, with which incumbents can be removed from the party leadership (e.g. Alderman and Smith 1990; McAnulla 2010) . What the above appraisal demonstrates is the dominant focus has been on elections, whether for vacancies (the majority of cases) or challenges which have been successful. The academic analysis of when party leaders survive, despite considerable questioning of their leadership, is thus the under-developed aspect of leadership selection studies.
The Non Removal of Gordon Brown
What made Brown vulnerable to eviction? Some of his critics, such as Charles Clarke and Frank Field, would claim that Brown lacked legitimacy flowing from the way in which he had acquired the Labour Party leadership in May 2007 (Quinn 2012: 88) . Brown had been elected unopposed as his only possible rival for the leadership, John McDonnell failed to secure the requisite number of parliamentary backers to initiate the Electoral College.
However, as Brown defeated McDonnell by 313 to 29 nominations (McDonnell needed 44 to
pass the nomination threshold or 12.5 per cent of the PLP), the argument that he lacked legitimacy at PLP level is erroneous. His legitimacy only came into question as his authority was undermined by his poor performance as prime minister (Foley 2009 ).
His deficiencies provoked limited sympathy within his own party. This was partly due to the reputation that Brown had acquired during the years waiting for Blair to step down. His fears about an alternative to himself emerging had contributed to him developing a reputation as a 'scheming fixer' and 'petty infighter' (Hughes 2010: 3) . However, Labour did experience an upsurge in their poll ratings in the first few months of his prime ministerial tenure, and there was an opportunity to enhance his legitimacy by securing his own mandate to lead Brown allowed expectations that he may call a snap general election to develop (Rawnsley 2010: 496-515) . When a Conservative recovery in the opinion polls emerged, Brown chose not to dissolve Parliament, but tried to claim that his decision was not influenced by the opinion polls. Brown's credibility never recovered from the election that never was in the autumn of 2007 (Foley 2009: 500) .
The cumulative impact of these factors contributed to a series of plots being initiated to remove Brown from the leadership, and as the speculation about possible challenges intensified, so did Brown's 'hyper-sensitivity to potential rivals' (Kenny 2009a: 503) . The speculation disfigured Labour Party politics between mid 2008 and around January 2010.
There were three substantive plots against him, which were interpreted by political commentators as preludes to the removal of Brown. These occurred in July 2008; June 2009 and January 2010. The first rumoured plot involved the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, whose advisors decided to make a 'significant intervention' (Hasan and MacIntyre 2011: 139 ). Miliband's Guardian article ostensibly did nothing more than outline what Labour needed to do to reconnect with the electorate, but his failure to mention Brown by name, was interpreted as indicating his willingness to be an alternative leader of the party (Hasan and MacIntyre 2011: 140) .
The second substantive plot presented a more serious threat to Brown. The dual impact of the fallout of the expenses scandal and poor local and European parliamentary election results, led to a series of ministerial resignations. The expenses scandal forced two cabinet ministersJacqui Smith and Hazel Blears -to resign, and Caroline Flint resigned claiming that Brown ran a two tier administration that marginalised female ministers. Of greater significance, however, was the resignation from cabinet of James Purnell. His resignation letter, which claimed that Brown continuing as prime minister made a Conservative victory 'more, not less likely', ended with the request that Brown 'stand aside to give our party a fighting chance of winning' (Quinn 2012: 89) . Press speculation now focused on whether other Cabinet ministers would resign, thus assuming that Brown would depart voluntarily if they did, without a formal challenge being needed. However, with senior Cabinet figures, such as Harriet Harman, Jack Straw and critically, Peter Mandelson rallying behind Brown, the most likely beneficiary of this plot, David Miliband, decided not to resign, and thus Brown survived (Quinn 2012: 89) .
One final attempted putsch was initiated in January 2010 and was co-ordinated by former cabinet ministers, Geoff Hoon and Patricia Hewitt. A letter was circulated amongst Labour MPs demanding a vote of confidence in Brown. This request contravened the constitution of the party, which had no provision for confidence motions regarding the party leader. The intention was to attempt to circumnavigate the procedures by initiating a 'frontbench coup'.
Cabinet members dissatisfied with Brown remained out of sight and did not answer their telephones in the aftermath of the circulation of the letter. The impact of their reluctance to publicly endorse him would force Brown into resigning given that the cabinet were no longer backing him (Quinn 2012: 90) . However, as the hours passed and Harman and Straw backed off from asking for Brown's resignation, (which was supposedly part of the plan), so cabinet ministers gradually began to offer their support. David Miliband, who had been 'waiting to see what happened', eventually stood outside the Foreign Office and announced he was 'getting on with his job' (Hasan and MacIntyre 2011: 169) .
The Removal of Kevin Rudd
Kevin Rudd's removal can be seen as a consequence of deep personal flaws and institutional pressure. The simple answer as to why the ALP ousted Rudd is that they had the institutional capability to remove the leader and were willing to use this collective caucus power. Since Under Labor, Bob Hawke managed to see off Paul Keating's first party room challenge in 1991, but after a destabilising six month backbench campaign from Keating, lost the prime ministership. Evaluations of the first short lived Rudd period of office and its dramatic end divide between the personal (Stuart 2010; Marr 2010 , Jackman 2008 , Megalogonis 2010 and weightier structural analyses (Evans 2010; Walter 2011; Rhodes and Tiernan 2013 ).
Rudd had arrived in Canberra in 1998, determined to make his way to the top of the Labor party. His political experience was honed as Chief of Staff under Queensland Premier Wayne Goss. He had a singular desire to lead the federal party and 'He didn't hide his ambitions' (Marr 2010: 40) Rudd also faced a growing backlash against his style of governing (Tiernan 2008; Strangio 2013 ). The critique of Rudd's style of management centres on the impact of a dysfunctional leader on the various aspects of prime ministerial power. Rudd failed to work with and through his cabinet (Marr 2010; Evans 2010) . Decisions were concentrated in a 'gang of four' of Rudd, Treasurer Wayne Swann, Lindsay Tanner and Julia Gillard. Despite early policy successes the signs were there that Rudd may be storing up trouble. He ran his affairs at a break neck pace, insider comments such as 'it is impossible to exaggerate the degree of personal intervention by the prime minister. It's his personality', became commonplace (Tiernan 2008) . His insistence on personal control across the full spectrum of the government's policy and media management put a huge strain on his staff and inevitably led to a backlash against such micromanagement.
A constant link is made between the policy failures, dysfunctional governing style and Rudd's apparently flawed personality and fitness to lead. The impact of his personality was such that policies were never followed through to conclusion, left in limbo, U-turns performed and government mired in indecision and failure. The slide in the polls created alarm, but it was Rudd who had brought this on himself. Yet it is impossible to assess the removal of Rudd without analysing the factional cleavages that any leader of the Labor party must take heed of in order to survive (Davis 2011; Gauja 2011; Leigh 2000; Warhurst and Parkin 2000) .The ability to hold the support of the parliamentary party is crucial to remaining in power (Bennister 2007 (Bennister , 2008 (Bennister , 2012 , even more so with a parliamentary caucus of 115 in the ALP In early May 2010, with an election due later in the year, the consequences of the downturn in the Labor government's fortunes hit party strategists. The party's primary vote had slumped to 35 per cent and Rudd's own approval rating fell into negative territory for the first time (Stuart 2010) . Rudd had generated this autonomous relationship with the public to reach beyond the party factions, but it left him vulnerable when the polls fell in such a dramatic fashion (even allowing for anelectoral cycle depressing support for the incumbent government in the winter months). Labor party 'machine politics' kicked in and the powerbrokers began to think the unthinkable: replacing a sitting prime minister in his first term of office (Kent 2010: 313) . The window of opportunity meant that any challenge had to be concluded successfully by 24 June, the last parliamentary sitting day of the term. MPs would break for winter and caucus would be dispersed after this date. Any earlier move and the new prime minister would be swiftly exposed to the opposition. As Julia Gillard was the only credible alternative to Rudd, it was hoped she would benefit from a political honeymoon over the winter before the polls picked up in spring, leading to the sunny uplands of the impending general election. Gillard rebuffed approaches, but as it became obvious that Rudd was isolated and Gillard had the numbers she decided to stand (Gauja 2011: 11) . Surprisingly few MPs and journalists were aware of how developed the coup had become, with many senior players still in the dark (Stuart 2010) . Although vowing to fight on, after takings soundings he realised he had little support in the caucus, one conservative estimate gave him no more that 20 of the 118 caucus votes in the party room and these were largely sympathy votes (Stuart 2010: 278) . Rudd withdrew from the contest, allowing Gillard to be elected unopposed at the caucus meeting the following morning.
In contrast to Rudd's lack of solid numbers in caucus, Gillard had realised early on that maintaining a factional powerbase was crucial in the 'gang warfare' of ALP politics (Kent 2010; Davis 2011) . Rudd failed to heed the lesson of Labor leaders; he led no faction within the party and owed his position to a broader constituency based on the opinion polls. He had not shaped the party around himself as Gough Whitlam had done. He was not steeped in the Labor party as a favourite son as with Bob Hawke and he had not battled to the top after a long internal struggle as had Paul Keating (Marr 2010) . The lack of a stable and loyal powerbase in the party (as shown by his ability to develop sufficient numbers of supporters within the caucus) added to his centralising tendencies combined to create a vulnerability to the Rudd leadership (Stuart 2010) .
The Removal of Julia Gillard
When the dust settled on Gillard's three years as Labor leader and prime minister, the extent of the oppositional forces she had to battle with became apparent. From inside the party Rudd led a campaign to destabilise her and retained a degree of caucus support and wider electoral support, the Liberal-led opposition had regrouped around Abbott's leadership and the forces of the press circled around Australia's first female prime minister (Bennister 2013 
Understanding Ease of Removal: Party Institutions, Culture and Circumstances
The explanation for the removals of Rudd and Gillard and the non removal of Brown can be understood by comparing the respective party institutions; party cultures; and political circumstances. That is to say it is more than just the institutional arrangements that define the leadership succession as Weller has implied. Rather procedures operate in conjunction with the cultural norms which shape the respective parties, as well as circumstances that determine how easy it is to remove incumbents.
In the case of Brown it is clear that the Electoral College constitutes a protective shield for incumbent Labour Party leaders, and that protection is even more pronounced when in office as the principle of initiating a contest requires the approval of party conference (Quinn 2005: 809) . Thus Weller is justified in noting that incumbents benefit from strong procedural obstacles that enhance their security of tenure as there are considerable disincentives for challengers (Quinn 2012: 82-94) .
In order for a challenger to proceed to the Electoral College they need to secure the backing of 20 per cent (or 71) of Labour MPs, which was a high threshold for a challenger to pass (Dorey and Denham 2011: 289) . What also impedes challengers is the way in which the Electoral College works. Its procedural inflexibility means that a prospective challenger has a series of costs that may put them off initiating their challenge. These costs can be defined as decision costs; financial costs; and disunity costs. Decision costs mean shifting the focus away from policy implementation and effective governing, alongside critiquing the opposition, as the party turns in on itself. Financial costs reflect the varying burdens that can be imposed upon the party depending on the selection procedures that they utilise. Disunity costs reflect the risks associated with rival candidates condemning their respective policy positions. With the rules permitting prolonged periods for electioneering, and the time for formal balloting to be conducted, the consequence is political paralysis for the party if they attempt to use the Electoral College (as intended) whilst in office (Quinn 2005: 795-6 ).
Given those constraints potential challengers (and their supporters) had to ask themselves the following question. Is it viable for a governing party, on the brink of facing the electorate in the midst of an economic recession to set aside around four months for an expensive leadership challenge, which by its very nature will set Labour elites and factional blocks against each other? (Quinn 2005: 799-801) . With the costs of mobilising a challenge so high the PLP became trapped in a 'vicious circle'. The government would be undermined by an event led to further questioning of Brown's competence, whereupon Labour MPs 'would be rumoured to be mobilising an attempt to unseat him; and then they would hit the brick wall of the procedures which make it so difficult to unseat the incumbent' (Heppell 2010: 193) .
There were also wider risks for potential challengers such as Miliband. These involved risks for them personally, but also a calculation of the risks for their assumed supporters. This reflects the strategic choices that they would have as prime ministerial aspirants. 'Serious' candidates for the succession, who wanted to succeed Brown as an alternative leader had to challenge him directly (Weller 2012: 153) . The in it from the start rules (IFTS) meant that they could not use a backbench or alternative front bench stalking horse candidate to challenge Brown. This option, in which the alternative challenger wounds Brown to such an extent that he stands down creating a vacancy, whereupon the leading candidate enters, was not available. The necessity of having to challenge directly incurs increased risk, but not just for the candidate themselves. A potential alternative would presumably have a 'court' of parliamentary backers and they also have to calculate the cost-benefit analysis for themselves personally, in terms of their careers. To initiate a contest the challenger would need to acquire the backing of 71out of 363 Labour MPs. If the challenger resigned from Cabinet themselves they would find it difficult to persuade those occupying ministerial office (approaching 100 Labour MPs were ministers in the Brown government) to resign in order to sign nomination papers backing the challenge. Their fear would be Brown might survive meaning that their disloyalty to Brown would be punished. Not only would a speedy return to ministerial office be blocked, but they had to factor in the way in which Brown dealt with disloyalty -i.e. his reputation of negative briefing against his rivals and critics (Quinn 2012: 91) . Keating's defeat the centre left faded (largely through a combination of retirements, defeat, and shift of the remaining to become unaligned) and although the Right is the dominant faction, the party is largely polarised between two core factional groups of Left and Right (Gauja 2011) . Rudd used the Right faction to gain the leadership, but one of his many errors was not cultivating this support in the party room. Factionalism only became entrenched in the ALP when a more orchestrated system emerged to allocate party positions in the 1980s.
John Howard was adept at working the Liberal party room to neuter his challenger Peter Costello, ruthless in removing his opponents and assiduous in cultivating his supporters (Bennister 2008 (Bennister , 2012 ). Rudd's relationship with the powerbrokers in the Labor party was key to understanding his rise to the top, his demise and then return. With such a small caucus and party room, a prime minister who wishes to survive needs to put in the hard yards in Canberra. Rudd's efforts to override 'the machine' were bound to come unstuck. When elected as prime minister, Rudd broke with tradition (and parliamentary party rules) in announcing that he would not be consulting with factional leaders when appointing his first Cabinet (Gauja 2011; Strangio et al 2013) . Initially this was interpreted as an indication of the decline of factional power in the party, but closer investigation shows that it made little difference, faction leaders were consulted and as ever a leader needs to balance state and factional interests (Kefford 2013: 139) . Leigh predicted in 2000 that factionalism in the ALP, largely driven by ideological bases now no longer as relevant, had reached its zenith. Cavalier (2005, 2012 ) though points to factions as 'executive placement agencies', having succeeded in capturing the ALP organisation whereby a smallpolitical class dominated decision-making, increasingly discontented from the Australian public.
The Rudd-Gillard battle demonstrated that factions still maintained a hold on the upper echelons of the ALP and the operational mechanisms of an increasingly dysfunction party.
Although policy differences were minimal between the two, the consequences of losing factional support were considerable. Gillard who owed her position to the factions (coming from the Left, but supported in her challenge to Rudd by the Right) understood this dynamic better than Rudd. Conscious of how the public tends to be most aware of the ALP's factional politics during such leadership disputes (Economou2010), she realised she needed to legitimise her leadership early on by calling an election. Gillard could not see off Rudd during her three years as prime minister nor counter the notion that she had ruthlessly ousted her predecessor. Much as Brown had posed a constant threat to Blair, so Rudd undermined and destabilised the Gillard minority government. Brown though had been inside the tent, Rudd after the 2012 failed challenge was outside the government, acting more like Keating, sitting on the backbench carping and plotting against Hawke.
A simple structural analysis would present the return to Rudd as an acceptance by caucus that they got in wrong in elevating Gillard in 2010 and seized the opportunity to return to the Rudd project. Such analyses expose the dysfunction evident in the ALP: 'There are few checks and balances within the party itself; with whom do these caucus members actually consult before deciding whom they'll support in a leadership ballot? A few faction bosses, perhaps a union official here and there; but let's not confuse such methods with democracy' (Bongiorno 2013a) (footage of which went viral). Gillard, as Australia's first female prime minister faced a set of unique circumstances that impacted on her leadership and played a considerable part in the framing of her period of office and ultimate removal. Prior to 2010, Gillard had been subject to sexist attacks regarding her childlessnesss and marital status, but once she became prime minister the intensity and vitriolic nature of the abuse rose considerably (Sawer 2013) . The sexual vilification of Gillard fed into the framing of her as a 'liar' (for her broken campaign promises) and 'traitor' (for the way she ousted Rudd). She was judged by different standards from her male counterparts (Sawer 2013; Summers 2012 ). Gillard's admirable effort to counter the media and opposition narrative in parliament gave her a slight personal rating bounce and bought her some time. She sought to capitalise with a surprise announcement at the end of January that the next election would be on 14 September 2013. In a move designed to end speculation of her leadership and place the party on an early election footing, she had hoped to remove uncertainty from her tenure. It had the opposition effect as it presented Rudd with a timetable to mobilise against her.
Rudd moved swiftly on resuming the premiership (he saw the Gillard period as an unfortunate aberration), in contrast to Gillard's early election announcement in 2010, Rudd announced a package of party reforms. Party change in Australia had always bucked the trend identified in the literature, whereby factional conflict is temporarily suspended when a party achieves vote success (Budge et al 2010). The Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) standing orders stated that all members of the caucus were eligible to vote in the leadership election with the winning candidate determined by a run-off ballot (Gauja 2011) . Rudd sought to change this on reassuming the leadership. Central to the reform package, and in the hope of capitalising on his new found caucus support, he pushed through a change to the leadership selection rules. The proposals to widen the electorate for leadership ballots to the party membership giving equal weight with the caucus required a formal rule change at a special parliamentary caucus meeting on 21 July 2013. In contrast to the Electoral College in the British Labour party, the unions were not part of the new franchise (Gauja 2013 ).
Proposals to reform the election of party leaders were not new; in fact Rudd floated the idea in 2011. As noted, Australia has appeared out of step with most other liberal democratic parties in concentrating the election in the hands of a small parliamentary caucus. However the appearance of a sudden democratic conversion should be tempered with a political reality check (Gauja 2013; Manwaring 2013a; Quiggan 2013) . Rudd drew his strength from the party membership and by presenting reform early in his second go as party leader (with his political capital momentarily high again) forced through the issue to make sure that his personal position was bolstered. Rudd also set a high threshold at 75 per cent of the caucus required to remove an incumbent leader between elections (though this was swiftly reduced Ironically it was the caucus vote that secured the leadership for Shorten, The new rules, though introduced hastily (party members ended up paying for it), appeared to discourage any factional strife and initially at least presented a more united party (Bongiorno 2013b; Manwaring 2013b ).
The political culture of party leadership in Australia has always been 'brutal'. A 'spill' could be organised at short notice and defenestration was swift and ruthless. Though more common in Opposition than government it has been a powerful feature of party politics. Davis(1998: 172) observed that 'beyond doubt, party leadership in Australia operates on a Darwinian scale unmatched elsewhere in the Western parliamentary democracies.' The oligarchic nature of party organisation ensures that party leaders need to satisfy, placate, manipulate or cajole their peers to survive in post (Bynander and 't Hart 2007) . As Rudd and Gillard found out, once leadership speculation gets going in Canberra a cocktail of party power brokers and political journalists can easily destabilise an incumbent prime minister. A devastating critique of Rudd by journalist David Marr (2010) represented a tipping point in Rudd's fortunes for the public, meanwhile concerted internal party opposition was mobilising (Evans 2010: 261) . Although Rudd's micro management tendencies, short temper and indecision were known, Marr put a damaging perception of Rudd into the public domain. Once such speculation is set in motion it becomes a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', as leadership consolidation is an elusive commodity in Australian politics (Bynander and 't Hart 2007) . Rudd and Gillard in common with many of their predecessors had to deal with interpersonal conflict and rivalry at the heart of the party. Factional politics meant he had no choice but to work with and through his Deputy, who clearly coveted his position. Challengers regroup and fight again as Keating did in 1991, but also leaders can hang around to fight to regain the crown as Howard did successfully and Peacock unsuccessfully in the Liberal party. Beazley had two spells as ALP leader and so Rudd's return was not so unusual. The vanquished in Australian politics are reluctant to leave the stage, desperately clinging on to power (Weller 2012) . Keating summed it up in characteristic forthright style 'You know, prime ministers have got Araldite on their pants, most of them. They want to stick to their seat. And you either put a sword through them or let the people do it' (Bennister 2012: 128; Brett 2007: 24) . The parliamentary caucus dynamic and machine politics create an Australian leadership setting in which 'hypocrisy, deceit and plotting are endemic' (Bynander and 't Hart 2007) . The widening of the leadership selectorate is unlikely to remove this abrasive political culture-after all factions still control pre-selections and national conference -with such a ruthless 'coup culture' ingrained at state as well as federal level (Bryant 2013 ). Yet the ALP may have set in train a party reform that will provide a level of stability all leaders crave.
Conclusion
This article challenges the prevailing assumption that the likely success of leadership evictions are solely determined by the leadership procedures that parties adopt. Noting the significance of circumstances and party cultures, the article has advanced two scenarios through which eviction attempts can be understood: first, forced exits triggered through the activation of formal procedures (Rudd and Gillard); second, attempts to force an exit by informal pressures outside of the formal procedures which are overcome by the incumbent (Brown).
The article has highlighted several similarities in the case studies. Brown and Rudd were complex characters unsuited to the demands of prime ministerial leadership. Their leadership styles were fatally flawed, leading to policy failure, indecision and internal rancour. Brown and Rudd had coveted the position and took power with high expectations, in Brown's case as an antidote to Blair, in Rudd's case after 11 years out of office. Gillard seized the reins to oust a dysfunctional leader and then faced the challenge of leading a minority government and a hostile media, unprepared or willing to accept a female prime minister. The Australian Labor party resolutely maintained a factional system, accompanied by strict party discipline, which concentrated leadership selection in the parliamentary caucus. The concentration of power in such a small elite of powerbrokers has made party leaders in Australia particularly vulnerable to challenge. Gillard struggled to shake off the impact of her usurpation of the crown and successfully counter the personal attacks on her. Rudd, mindful of the negative aspect of such leadership strife, placed the ALP on a path to wider and potentially more stable form of party leadership. Brown was fortunate that institutional rules in the UK have entrenched party leaders in place, creating greater obstacles for potential rivals. The Shorten election in 2013 may now see the ALP leader similarly entrenched and pressure is sure to mount for the Liberal party to follow the ALP in widening the leadership franchise.
Yet as the cases show, the likely success of leadership evictions will depend on a series of more complex factors. Informal pressures have a powerful influence, driven by party culture and context. A cocktail of policy failure, command leadership and a dramatic slump in the polls drove the informal pressure against Rudd. Policy U-turns and increasing poll pressure counted against Gillard. A combination of media driven deconstruction of leadership and internal party angst and electoral anxiety sparked the 'spills'. All three party leaders faced concentrated media framing of their personality, in Gillard's case the political circumstance of having to manage a minority government and contend with a level of vicious misogyny put additional and perhaps unique pressure on her leadership. A creditable, alternative candidate does though need to be available and willing to stand as the incumbent struggles along. In Brown's case, the risks for potential challengers were substantially greater and there was no consensus around which candidate was best placed to replace him.
The immediacy of an Australian leadership 'spill', prior to the Rudd reforms, gave the challengers a great advantage over the drawn out and formalised electoral campaign in the Labour party. However while such formal constraints may represent an obvious explanation for greater leadership turnover in Australia, both the prevailing party culture and political circumstances play an important role in driving the success of leadership ejection.
